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Abstract
S-boxes are the non-linear part of DES cryptosystem. Along the years it has
became clear that any kind of edit to the structure of DES S-boxes increases
the probability of success of breaking the algorithm, which was very carefully
designed. The reason why the S-boxes were built in this way was clarified by
Coppersmith, years after the publication of the encryption algorithm.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate on Coppersmith’s DES S-boxes
design criteria and to evaluate them by way of SAT Solving, in order to ana-
lyze the performance of SAT-Solvers for different versions of DES algorithm,
in which S-boxes respect only a sample of Coppersmith’s design criteria. This
aim is achieved thanks to the implementation of a Python tool: DESBoxGen.
The main challenge in the design of DESBoxGen is the one of finding a
way to efficiently generating S-boxes satisfying certain criteria.
i

Introduction
Cryptography is an art, a science and a mathematical discipline, that studies
techniques for making digital systems and information sharing secure. Its
applications can be found everywhere.
One of the most widely known encryption schemes is the Data Encryption
Standard, DES, which has been used worldwide for more than 20 years and
for the same amount of time it has been studied by the whole world of
cryptographers. Several attacks were attempted to break DES and most of
them turned out not to be practicable due DES very careful design.
The motivations why attacks, like the differential cryptanalysis, are in-
feasible were clarified by Don Coppersmith [1], who explained the main design
criteria respected in the implementation of DES S-boxes and P-box, years
after the publication of the algorithm. Nowadays DES is not used anymore
due its short key length but the well-designed structure of the algorithm,
especially of the S-boxes, is undeniable.
In this thesis Coppersmith’s criteria have been evaluated by way of SAT
Solving through the implementation of an attack known as logical cryptana-
lysis. All these steps have been realized through the implementation of a
Python tool: DESBoxGen.
The main challenge in the design of DESBoxGen is the efficient generation
of S-boxes that respect only some of Coppersmith’s criteria. Difficulties have
been detected more in the generation phase than in the verification one, since
naive algorithms almost never produce S-boxes in compliance with some
criteria. To solve this problem, more complex implementations, like the
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graph-based stochastic one, have been realized.
This thesis explains the path followed for generating S-boxes and DESBoxGen,
mainly the encoding of DES variants into formulas and the evalutation of
Coppersmith’s design criteria. This work has the following structure:
• in the first chapter, SAT Solving is introduced, in order to explain
its role in logical crypanalysis, the operations that have to be applied
to formulas and the link between the search for a solution to a SAT
problem and breaking an algorithm;
• in the second chapter, a brief overview on DES is given. More spe-
cifically, its architecture, the main attacks attempted on it and Cop-
persmith’s explanation of the design choices behind implementation of
the algorithm are described;
• in the third chapter, the generation of S-boxes is discussed with all the
problems and the solutions detected;
• in the fourth chapter, all the implementation choices related to DESBoxGen’s
structure are presented and the conversion of a cryptanalytic attack on
DES into a SAT problem is explained;
• in the fifth chapter, the results of the tests previously generated through
DESBoxGen are displayed in order to evaluate Coppersmith’s criteria us-
ing three different SAT-Solvers: Picosat, CryptoMiniSat and Lingeling.
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Chapter 1
SAT Solving in Cryptanalysis
The problem of deciding if a propositional logic formula is satisfiable, i.e.
if there is an assignment of truth values to boolean variables such that the
formula is true, is the prototypical NP-complete problem1. On the following,
it will be referred to as SAT.
Despite the hardness of the problem, some of SAT instances can be solved
in a reasonable amount of time[3] through SAT-Solvers, that given a proposi-
tional formula look for a variable assignment such that the formula evaluates
to true. Many computational problems can be encoded as a SAT one, so
finding a solution for the logical problem corresponds to solving the initial
one.
In this thesis Logical Cryptanalysis [4] against DES and its variants has
been implemented by implementing cryptanalysis as a SAT problem so that
finding a model for this formula is equivalent to finding the encryption key
in a cryptanalitic attack.
1NP-completeness of SAT, the satisfiability problem, was discovered by Stephen Cook
and Leonid Levin in ’70s; they (independently) noticed the relation between complexity of
certain problems and that of the entire class. The demonstration of Cook-Levin theorem
is reported in [2].
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1.1 SAT-Solvers Input: DIMACS CNF
The majority of SAT-Solvers takes as input a propositional logic formula in
a format called DIMACS CNF, where CNF stands, as usual, for conjunctive
normal form.
1.1.1 Conjunctive and Disjunctive Normal Form
A CNF formula [5] is a conjunction of clauses,
F =
len(F )∧
i=1
Ci
where each clause must be a disjunction of literals,
Ci =
len(Ci)∨
j=1
Lj
and a literal is either a boolean variable, or its negation,
Lj = A | ¬A
Please notice that the presence of other connectives different from ∧,∨,¬
is not allowed. A similar form is the DNF, where DNF means disjunctive
normal form, i.e. the formula is a disjunction of clauses, where each clause
is a conjunction of literals. CNF formulas are the most common input to
SAT-Solvers because they are easy to evaluate: only a literal for each clause
has to be true so that the complete formula can be satisfied.
1.1.2 DIMACS CNF format details
The DIMACS CNF format is characterized by:
• some (optional) comments lines beginning with the character c
• a line indicating the format (CNF), followed by the number of variables
appearing in the file, followed by the number of clauses contained in
the file.
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p cnf NUMBER_OF_VARS NUMBER_OF_CLAUSES
• the lines representing the clauses, in which each variable is represented
by a number bigger than 0, if the variable is negated, it’s preceded by
the minus sign. 0 ends the clause.
For example, let
(¬A ∧D) ∨ (A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬C ∧ ¬D) ∨ (B ∧ C ∧ ¬D)
be a propositional logic formula, its representation in DIMACS CNF format
could be:
c Example of the previous formula in DIMACS CNF format
p cnf 4 3
−1 4 0
1 −2 −3 −4 0
2 3 −4 0
1.2 CNF Naive Conversion
To get the DIMACS file it’s necessary to have a formula in conjunctive normal
form. Each logic formula F can be transformed in CNF (or DNF) format,
FC , by applying standard logic rules [6]:
• Deletion of all operators other than ∨,∧,¬ through the application of
the following equivalences:
– (A =⇒ B) ≡ ¬A ∨B
– (A ⇐⇒ B) ≡ (A =⇒ B)∨ (B =⇒ A) ≡ (¬A∨B)∧ (¬B ∨A)
– (A⊕B) ≡ A ⇐⇒ ¬B ≡ (¬A ∧B) ∨ (¬B ∧ A)
• Pushing negation in front of single variables, so that only literals can
be negated, applying the following equivalences:
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– Double negation law: ¬¬A ≡ A
– De Morgan’s laws:
¬ (A ∧B) ≡ ¬A ∨ ¬B
¬ (A ∨B) ≡ ¬A ∧ ¬B
• Application of distributive laws such as Or distributive law in order to
get conjunction of disjunctions:
– Or distributive law: A ∨ (B ∧ C) ≡ (A ∨B) ∧ (A ∨ C)
In some cases (the worst one involving standard transformation is the
conversion of a DNF formula to a CNF one), the application of standard
rules can produce as side effect an exponential blowup in the size of the
formula, that increases the hardness of the problem. The so-called Tseitin’s
encoding prevents this.
1.3 Tseitin’s Encoding
Tseitin’s transformation [7] takes as input a propositional logic formula and
converts it into the CNF format, so it can be passed as input to a SAT-Solver.
This transformation introduces several auxiliary variables, in order to have
formula whose size has grown linearly relative to the input of the circuit,
and not exponentially like applying the naive CNF conversion illustrated in
Section 1.2. Even if Tseitin encoding introduces new variables, so the two
formulas F and F T are different, the conversion preserves their satisfiability,
i.e. F is satisfiable if and only if F T is satisfiable, thanks to the addition of
a series of constraints on these auxiliary variables.
1.3.1 The Tseitin’s Encoding, in Theory
Consider the following formula:
F = (A ∧B) ∨ (¬C ∧D)
F has four sub-formulas:
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1. ¬C
2. (¬C ∧D)
3. (A ∧B)
4. (A ∧B) ∨ (¬C ∧D)
Tseitin encoding introduces a new variable for each sub-formula:
1. aux1 ⇐⇒ ¬C
2. aux2 ⇐⇒ (aux1 ∧D)
3. aux3 ⇐⇒ (A ∧B)
4. aux4 ⇐⇒ aux3 ∨ aux2
To preserve the satisfiability of the formula, the conjunct of all the constraints
is taken as the result formula:
F T = aux4 ∧ (aux4 ⇐⇒ aux3 ∨ aux2) ∧ (aux3 ⇐⇒ (A ∧B))∧
∧(aux2 ⇐⇒ (aux1 ∧D)) ∧ (aux1 ⇐⇒ ¬C)
At this point it’s sufficient to convert each constraint / substitution to CNF,
applying the standard conversion algorithm (explained in 1.2), especially the
Iff equivalence
A ⇐⇒ B ≡ (¬A ∨B) ∧ (¬B ∨ A)
In this way, the F T of the example becomes:
F T = aux4 ∧ (¬aux4 ∨ aux3 ∨ aux2) ∧ (aux4 ∨ ¬(aux3 ∨ aux2))∧
∧(¬aux3 ∨ (A ∧B)) ∧ (aux3 ∨ ¬(A ∧B)) ∧ (¬aux2 ∨ (aux1 ∧D))∧
∧(aux2 ∨ ¬(aux1 ∧D)) ∧ (¬aux1 ∨ ¬C) ∧ (aux1 ∨ C)
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1.3.2 Tseitin’s Encoding in PyEDA and DESBoxGen
DESBoxGen makes use of PyEDA [8], a Python library for electronic design
automation, that implements the representation of logic expressions, Tseitin’s
encoding, and the conversion of a CNF formula into DIMACS CNF format.
PyEDA tseitin() method can be applied to expressions by specifying as
optional parameter only the name that the auxiliary variables should have.
However this implementations doesn’t allow (at the moment) an explicit
substitution of an expression with a new variable, so it’s possible to use this
new variable in further computations to avoid that the formula has an expo-
nentially large size when a big formula is converted to a CNF one. To work
around this limitation, DESBoxGen implements a subroutine that realizes
the replacement explicitly, applying PyEDA’s tseitin() method and the
appropriate logical equivalences so that the formula given as input is satis-
fiable if and only if the new variable is satisfiable.
The application of DESBoxGen replace() returns the new variable, that
will replace the complex formula and will be used in all the further com-
putations, and the binding, a CNF expression obtained through PyEDA
tseitin() method, that will be used in the end to ensure the logic equival-
ence between the variable and the complex formula. The details of the use of
the replace() function will be explained in the following chapters (see 4.4
for more details).
1.4 Truth table to CNF and DNF
In the implementation of DESBoxGen, it is necessary to recover the propos-
itional logic formula associated to a circuit, the motivation of this will be
explained in the forthcoming chapters. It’s possible to derive the formula in
CNF or DNF format directly from the truth table of the circuit.
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def replace ( formula , b_name , b_index , aux_name='aux' ) :
”””
Implementation o f ” shar ing ” :
d e f i n e a ” b inder ” v a r i a b l e as the a l i a s o f a more
complex formula , in order to use i t
in f u r t h e r opera t i ons .
: param formula : the formula t ha t must be rep l a ced
: param b name : the name o f the ” b inder ” v a r i a b l e
: param b index : the index o f the ” b inder ” v a r i a b l e
: param aux name : the name o f aux va r i a b l e s , to be used
in the r ep r e s en t a t i on o f the b ind ing
between formula and the ” b inder ” v a r i a b l e
: re turn : the ” b inder ” v a r i a b l e and a formula t ha t
r ep r e s en t s the ” b ind ing ”
”””
b = exprvar ( b_name , b_index )
binding = And (Or ( Not (b ) , formula ) , Or (b , Not ( formula ) ) )
binding = binding . tseitin ( auxvarname=aux_name )
return b , binding
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Consider, for example, the following truth table associated to a circuit:
A B C F
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
Each row can be represented as the conjunction of the literals in the same
row, in this case it is
numOfV ars∧
i=0
Lj
The DNF representation of the formula will be obtained by the disjunction of
the rows that satisfy F , because suffices an assignment of truth that satisfies
the formula:
2numOfV ars∨
j=0
rowj.(Fj = 1)
That in the example becomes:
F ≡ row0 ∨ row3 ∨ row7
F ≡ (¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬C) ∨ (¬A ∧B ∧ C) ∨ (A ∧B ∧ C)
Similarly it’s possible to get a logically equivalent CNF representation of the
formula by the conjunction of the negation of the rows that don’t satisfy the
formula:
2numOfV ars∧
j=0
¬rowj.(Fj = 0)
In order to satisfy the formula, no one of the rows (corresponding to an
assignment to the variables) that gives 0 as output can be chosen.
1.5 The Importance of Finding a Model 9
Going on with the example:
F ≡ ¬row1 ∧ ¬row2 ∧ ¬row4 ∧ ¬row5 ∧ ¬row6
F ≡ ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ C) ∧ ¬(¬A ∧B ∧ ¬C) ∧ ¬(A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬C)∧
∧¬(A ∧ ¬B ∧ C) ∧ ¬(A ∧B ∧ ¬C)
F ≡ (A∨B∨¬C)∧(A∨¬B∨C)∧(¬A∨B∨C)∧(¬A∨B∨¬C)∧(¬A∨¬B∨C)
To get the formula of a logic circuit, the Circuit class of DESBoxGen im-
plements truth table2formula(), a function that takes as input the list of
variables for the required encoded formula.
1.5 The Importance of Finding a Model
SAT Solving is used in DESBoxGen because it allows to find a model for
a formula, where a model corresponds to a satisfying interpretation for the
formula. In Logical Cryptanalysis, finding a model for a formula encoding a
circuit like DES is equivalent to finding a key with a known-plaintext attack.
These operations are simulated in DESBoxGen using SAT Solving to evaluate
the strength of DES variants against SAT-Solvers and after it, it is possible
to analyze the results in order to find differences in SAT-Solvers behaviour
through the analysis of ciphers with different levels of complexity.
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def truth_table2formula (self , f_vars ) :
”””
This method computes formulas r ep r e s en t i n g each
output b i t on the b a s i s o f the input ones .
: param f v a r s : exprvars v a r i a b l e s , one f o r each
input b i t
: re turn : a l i s t o f formulas d e s c r i b i n g the t r u t h
va lue o f each output b i t
”””
formula = [ expr (0 ) ] ∗ self . m
unconsidered_bit = [ True ] ∗ 4
for row in self . truth_table :
for out_pos in range ( self . m ) :
if row [ self . n + out_pos ] == '1' :
# compute the expre s s i on corresponding
to the row
for in_pos in range ( self . n ) :
bit = f_vars [ in_pos ] if row [ in_pos ]
== '1' else Not ( f_vars [ in_pos ] )
if in_pos == 0 :
ex = bit
else :
ex = And (ex , bit )
if unconsidered_bit [ out_pos ] :
formula [ out_pos ] = ex
unconsidered_bit [ out_pos ] = False
else :
formula [ out_pos ] = Or ( formula [
out_pos ] , ex )
return formula
Chapter 2
The Data Encryption Standard
The Data Encryption Standard, better known as DES, is a well-designed
block cipher of great historical importance, which has been used worldwide
for more than 20 years, even if now it is considered insecure because of its
short key length. Before seeing DESBoxGen variants and their implementa-
tion for Logical Cryptanalysis, in this chapter there will be a brief overview
on DES, its historical importance and its main components.
2.1 History
The DES symmetric-key algorithm was developed in the ’70s by an IBM
team working on cryptography (which involved also Horst Feistel) under the
original name of Lucifer, and it was proposed to NBS (the National Bureau of
Standards, now the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST))
that was looking for a standard cryptographic algorithm that should have
been included in a program to protect computer and communication data
[11]. This algorithm should have been cheaper and readily available and
the compliance with all these features brought DES to success: despite the
hardness of the algorithm, it used only simple logical operations that could
be easily implemented in hardware.
NSA (National Security Agency) helped NBS in the evaluation of Lucifer’s
11
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security and suitability as standard and requested some substantial modific-
ations to the original version of the algorithm, particularly a reduction of the
key length from 128 bits to 56 bits. The reasons why NSA modified some
components in the original algorithm became clear only in ’90s but, despite
the doubts, DES became a standard and the publication of its details al-
lowed a software implementation, that led all the cryptographers to study
the “secure” encryption algorithm.
Several details about DES history can be found in Federal Processing
Standards Publications, for example in [13] there are all the reasons why
DES should have been used and its suitability for Federal standards.
An encryption algorithm must satisfy the following requirements in order to
be acceptable as a Federal standard:
1. It must provide a high level of security.
2. It must be completely specified and easy to understand.
3. The security provided by the algorithm must not be based upon the
secrecy of the algorithm.
4. It must be available to all users and suppliers.
5. It must be adaptable for use in diverse applications.
6. It must be economical to implement in electronic devices and be effi-
cient to use.
7. It must be amenable to validation.
8. It must be exportable.
The algorithm described in FIPS PUB 46 satisfies all these requirements.
In 1987, NSA noticed that the algorithm would have been soon broken but
the diffused disappointment at NSA’s announcement of not recertification
of the standard and the absence of a valid alternative to DES encryption
algorithm led to the reaffirmation of DES as a standard until 1992.
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Between 1993 and 1994, at the dawn of the discovery of differential crypt-
analysis, some motivations behind DES implementation choices became fi-
nally clear: the method of differential cryptanalysis, published by Biham
and Shamir [9], was just discovered and it reported the first theoretical at-
tack with less complexity than brute force but it required an unrealistic 247
chosen plaintexts to succeed. Differential cryptanalysis was already known
when DES was designed and its design criteria contributed in defeating this
kind of attack. Despite its strength against differential cryptanalysis, the
technological progress and advances in hardware blew down DES: its short
key length was its main weakness and this allowed brute-force attacks to suc-
ceed on DES even in less than a day. DES was reconfirmed as standard under
the form of Triple DES, until the publication of the Advanced Encryption
Standard in 2001.
2.2 Structure
DES is a block cipher that works with 64-bit blocks, that implements a
symmetric algorithm using a 16-round Feistel Network. As declared in [13]
The DES algorithm is mathematically a one-to-one mapping of
the 2” possible input blocks onto all 264 possible output blocks.
Since there are 256 possible active keys, there are 256 possible
mappings. Selecting one key selects one of the mappings.
The plaintext is permuted through an IP, Initial Permutation, followed by
the application of the key-based Feistel Network, and in the end it’s applied
a final 32-bit swap and a FP, Final Permutation, that is the inverse of the
IP.
2.2.1 Symmetric Key Cipher
DES represents a symmetric encryption model that is characterized by
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• an encryption algorithm, E, that performs various substitutions and
transformations on the plaintext;
• a secret key given as input to E. Transformations performed by E on
the plaintext depend on the key;
• a decryption algorithm, D, that is E run in reverse.
Symmetric key based communications security depends on the key, that is
the only private element, kept by the sender and the receiver, that makes un-
intelligible encrypted messages readable. Given a message P and the private
encryption key K, the encryption algorithm computes the ciphertext
C = EK(P )
The receiver, who knows the secret key, can invert the transformation
P = DK(C)
There are two different ways of processing the input: the stream cipher and
the block cipher; DES represents the last one so it processes the input one
block at time, producing an output block for each input block.
2.2.2 Feistel Network
A Feistel Network is a common pattern adopted in the construction of block
ciphers, having the advantage that encryption and decryption are almost
identical, they require only a reversed key schedule. As explained in [12]:
A Feistel network thus gives a way to construct an invertible
function from non-invertible components.
Its structure is composed of several rounds, which can inner use non invertible
functions. In each round, a keyed round function is applied. If the block
length of the cipher is l bits, the round function takes as input a l/2-bit
string and a sub-key ki and returns a l/2 bit string. Sub-keys are generated
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f1
f2
f3
f4
L0 R0
L4 R4
Figure 2.1: Example of a 4-round Feistel Network
starting from the master key. The input of the i-th round is divided in two
halves, Li−1 and Ri−1 of length l/2, and the respective output is computed
as follows.
Li = Ri−1
Ri = Li−1 ⊕ fi(Ri−1)
A Feistel network is invertible regardless of the round functions. Given the
output (Li, Ri) the input can be computed as follows:
Li−1 = Ri ⊕ fi(Ri−1)
Ri−1 = Li
without the inversion of the round function. As Katz and Lindell say in [12]:
Let F be a keyed function defined by a Feistel network. Then re-
gardless of the round functions {f̂i} and of the number of rounds,
Fk is an efficiently invertible permutation for all k.
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2.2.3 Shannon’s Confusion-Diffusion Paradigm
A block cipher must behave like a random permutation as described by
Shannon’s confusion-diffusion paradigm [10]. The application of the multiple
rounds of the Feistel network ensures an avalanche effect, i.e. small changes
in the input must affect all the yield. It’s possible to make the behaviour of
DES similar to a random permutation thanks to the confusion/diffusion steps
corresponding to a round, so that a single input bit can potentially affect all
the bits of the output. As Shannon said above confusion and diffusion:
In the method of diffusion the statistical structure of M which
leads to its redundancy is “dissipated” into long range statist-
ics—i.e., into statistical structure involving long combinations of
letters in the cryptogram. The effect here is that the enemy must
intercept a tremendous amount of material to tie down this struc-
ture, since the structure is evident only in blocks of very small
individual probability. Furthermore, even when he has sufficient
material, the analytical work required is much greater since the
redundancy has been diffused over a large number of individual
statistics... The method of confusion is to make the relation
between the simple statistics of E and the simple description of
K a very complex and involved one.
Substitutions, permutations and other components of DES are an implement-
ation of the confusion-diffusion paradigm.
2.2.4 DES Round Function
DES round function takes as input the sub-key and 32 bits corresponding to
the right half of the input.
f(ki, Ri−1)
The input is expanded through an Expansion-box to a 48-bit value, that is
XORed with the 48-bit sub-key, and the result is the input of the S-boxes.
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48-bits
E-box
32-bit input 48-bit sub-key
48-bits (8×6-bits)
32-bits (8×4-bits)
P-box
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
Figure 2.2: Structure of a round in DES
This value is divided into 8 parts, that become the input of the S-boxes,
S1, ..., S8. An S-box takes as input 6 bits and returns 4 bits. The concaten-
ation of the output of the S-boxes gives a 32 bit result. The application of
the Permutation-box to the 32-bit result gives the final output of the round
function. The Expansion-box and the Permutation-box are a linear compon-
ent of DES round function and both of them perform diffusion [11], instead
the S-boxes perform confusion.
S-boxes
The S-boxes are the only nonlinear component of DES round function. The
substitution choices should not be chosen randomly but should be carefully
designed in order to grant the avalanche effect in the application of multiple
rounds of Feistel network according to Shannon’s confusion and diffusion
paradigm. Their official description is given as a lookup table so that given
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the 6-bit input the 4-bit output is identified by selecting the row using the 2
outer bits of the input and the column using the 4 inner ones.
14 4 13 1 2 15 11 8 3 10 6 12 5 9 0 7
0 15 7 4 14 2 13 1 10 6 12 11 9 5 3 8
4 1 14 8 13 6 2 11 15 12 9 7 3 10 5 0
15 12 8 2 4 9 1 7 5 11 3 14 10 0 6 13
Table 2.1: DES S-box 1
In ’70s the values associated to S-boxes created several suspicions about
the presence of trapdoors in DES. The motivations behind the choices be-
came clear only in ’90s after the Biham and Shamir’s discovery of differential
cryptanalysis and Coppersmith’s declaration about DES design criteria that
revealed the careful S-box design criteria (see [1]).
2.2.5 Key Transformation
The application of the round function depends from Ri, the right part of
the input text of the i-th round, and Ki, the round-sub-key. Sub-keys are
generated starting from the 64-bit master-key, reduced to 56-bit key by ig-
noring eighth bits that can be used as parity bits. The 48-bit sub-keys are
generated from the 56-bit key by splitting the input in two 28-bit halves that
are left-shifted by one or two bits, depending on the round.
Key space and weak keys
The aim of an attacker is to discover the key so that if he knows the algorithm,
all the encrypted messages can be decrypted. The probability to succeed
depends also on the key space, that, in the case of DES, is near 256. In
fact, as declared in [13], there are some weak and semiweak keys to avoid,
because they make the same subkey to be generated in more than one round.
The application of one of the 4 weak keys produces 16 identical subkeys , so
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decryption is identical to encryption
EK(EK(P )) = P
The 4 weak keys in hex are:
0x0101010101010101
0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE
0xE0E0E0E0F1F1F1F1
0x1F1F1F1F0E0E0E0E
Moreover DES has also semi-weak keys, such that for each key K there exists
a key K ′ for which encryption with K is identical to decryption with K ′ and
vice versa. These keys are called dual keys [13]
0x011F011F010E010E 0x1F011F010E010E01
0x01E001E001F101F1 0xE001E001F101F101
0x01FE01FE01FE01FE 0xFE01FE01FE01FE01
0x1FE01FE00EF10EF1 0xE01FE01FF10EF10E
0x1FFE1FFE0EFE0EFE 0xFE1FFE1FFE0EFE0E
0xE0FEE0FEF1FEF1FE 0xFEE0FEE0FEF1FEF1
By applying dual keys it results that
EK(EK′(P )) = P
DK(DK′(P )) = P
There are also 48 keys, the possibly weak keys listed in [14], that produce
only four distinct subkeys (instead of 16) and should be avoided. In total the
keys that should be avoided are 64 (4 weak keys, 6 pairs of semi-weak keys
and 48 possibily weak keys) out of the 256.
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2.3 Attacks on DES
Several attacks are possible against a cipher [12], which are listed below in
order of increasing power of the attacker:
• Ciphertext-only attack: the adversary attempts to determine some
information about the plaintext and the key observing only the cipher-
text.
• Known-plaintext attack: the adversary is able to learn one or more
(plaintext, ciphertext) pairs generated using some key. The aim of the
attacker is to recover the key in order to get further informations about
the underlying plaintext of some ciphertext encrypted using the same
key.
• Chosen-plaintext attack: the adversary can obtain plaintext/cipher-
text pairs for plaintexts of its choice, in order to recover the key as in
the previous case.
• Chosen-ciphertext attack: the adversary is able to obtain also in-
formations about the decryption of ciphertexts of its choice, in order
to recover the key for the same reasons of the previous cases.
The most practical attack on DES is still a brute-force attack, even if there are
different theoretical cryptanalytic attacks, requiring an unrealistic number of
couples (plaintext, ciphertext).
2.3.1 Brute-force Attacks
A brute-force attack tries every key in key-space, and despite its naive ap-
proach, it can succeed because of the shortness of DES key length, that was
reduced from 128 bits to 56 bits, after NSA involvement in DES implement-
ation. DES vulnerability became definitely clear in 1990s. In 1997 a message
encrypted with DES was broken for the first time and the following attacks
required less and less time.
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2.3.2 Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis [15] is one of the theoretical attacks that can break
DES with less complexity than a brute-force attack. This one is a chosen-
plaintext attack, so the analysis of differences in the ciphertexts allows to
formulate assumptions on the cipher key.
The rationale behind differential cryptanalysis is to observe the
behavior of pairs of text blocks evolving along each round of the
cipher, instead of observing the evolution of a single text block.
Although the reduced complexity of this attack, it is only theoretical because
it requires 247 chosen plaintexts to succeed. After the rediscovery of differ-
ential cryptanalysis in 1991 by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir [9], Coppersmith
revealed that it was known to both IBM and NSA, and DES design criteria
were defined to increase the resistance against this attack, that’s why it is
not practicable (the details of design criteria will be explained in 2.4). Per-
mutation and S-boxes modifications reflect the role of the need of strengthen
DES against differential cryptanalysis as said in [15]
Differential cryptanalysis of an eight-round LUCIFER algorithm
requires only 256 chosen plaintexts, whereas an attack on an
eight-round version of DES requires 214 chosen plaintexts.
2.3.3 Linear Cryptanalysis
Another kind of attack attempted on DES is the linear cryptanalysis, dis-
covered by Mitsuru Matsui in 1993, that uses 243 known plaintexts, as well it
is an infeasible attack on DES, even if DES should not be meant to be resist-
ant to this attack. Variants of this attack with reduction in data complexity
require from 239 up to 241 chosen-plaintexts.
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2.4 Coppersmith’s Criteria
Differential cryptanalysis was well known, however, to the IBM
team that designed DES, as early as 1974. Knowledge of this
technique and the necessity to strengthen DES against this attack
using it, played a large part in the design of the S-boxes and the
permutation P.
The previous and the following are declarations by Don Coppersmith in [1],
that’s why a differential cryptanalysis attack against DES requires enormous
amount of chosen plaintext.
The IBM team knew about differential cryptanalysis but did not
publish any reference to it.
In [1] Coppersmith, after an explanation of DES and differential cryptana-
lysis, listed the relevant criteria for the S-boxes and the permutation P, which
were satisfied by the design of DES:
S-1 Each S-box has six bits of input and four bits of output. (This
was the largest size that we could accommodate and still fit all
of DES onto a single chip in 1974 technology.)
S-2 No output bit of an S-box should be too close to a linear func-
tion of the input bits. (That is, if we select any output bit
position and any subset of the six input bit positions, the frac-
tion of inputs for which this output bit equals the XOR of these
input bits should not be close to 0 or 1, but rather should be
near to 1/2)
S-3 If we fix the leftmost and the rightmost input bits of the S-box
and vary the four middle bits, each possible 4-bit output is
attained exactly once as the middle four input bits range over
their 16 range possibilities.
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S-4 If two inputs to an S-box differ in exactly one bit, the outputs
must differ in at least two bits. (That is, if |∆Ii,j| = 1, then
|∆Oi,j| ≥ 2, where |x| is the number of 1-bits in the quantity
x.)
S-5 If two inputs to an S-box differ in the two middle bits exactly,
the outputs must differ in at least two bits. (If ∆Ii,j = 001100,
then |∆Oi,j| ≥ 2.)
S-6 If two inputs to an S-box differ in their first two bits and are
identical in their last two bits, the two outputs must not be
the same. (If ∆Ii,j = 11xy00, where x and y are arbitrary bits,
then ∆|Oi,j| 6= 0)
S-7 For any nonzero 6-bit difference between inputs, ∆Ii,j, no more
than eight of the 32 pairs of inputs exhibiting ∆Ii,j may result
in the same output difference ∆Oi,j
S-8 Similar to (S-7), but with stronger restrictions in the case of
∆Oi,j = 0, for the case of three active S-boxes on round i.
P-1 The four output bits from each S-box at round i are distributed
so that two of them affect (provide input for) “middle bits” of
S-boxes at round i + 1 (the two middle bits of input to an
S-box, not shared with adjacent S-boxes), and the other two
affect “end bits” (the two left-hand bits or the two right-hand
bits, which are shared with adjacent S-boxes.)
P-2 The four output bits from each S-box affect six different S-
boxes; no two affect the same S-box. (Remember that each
”end bit” affects two adjacent S-boxes.)
P-3 For two S-boxes j, k, if an output bit from Sj affects a middle
bit of Sk, then an output bit from Sk cannot affect a middle
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bit of Sj. This implies that in the case j = k, an output bit
from Sj must not affect a middle bit of Sj.
Chapter 3
Generating S-boxes
In order to analyze the behaviour of DES variants, it is necessary to build
different S-boxes that will respect only some of Coppersmith’s criteria. In
this chapter the implementation of the construction and the verification for
a sample of S-boxes design criteria will be discussed.
The generation has to be done in a random way in order to consider
all the possible S-boxes in compliance with some criteria. At the moment
DESBoxGen allows, for every i, the generation of S-boxes satisfying s1, ..., si
until i equal to six.
Different stochastic generation algorithms will be discussed, since naive
functions almost never satisfy some of Coppersmith’s requirements.
3.1 S-box as Subclass of Circuit
The class Sbox is a subclass of the Circuit class that allows the representa-
tion of a logic circuit, characterized by a defined fixed number of input (n in)
and output bits (m out) that are necessary for the construction of the truth
table.
class Circuit :
def __init__ (self , n_in , m_out , io={} , others='z' ) :
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The outputs of the circuit can be chosen either randomly or they can be
specified during the creation of an instance of this class:
• The defined cases are realized through the io dictionary, where inputs
are the keys and their outputs are the related values.
• In the undefined ones, i.e. if an input does not appear in the io dic-
tionary, the output can be chosen in three different ways according to
the value of the parameter others: it can be set to zero(’z’), one (’o’)
or random(’r’).
class Sbox ( Circuit ) :
def __init__ (self , n_in=6, m_out=4, lt=[ ] , io={} ,
others='r' , min_dc=0) :
Sbox attributes are:
n integer
the size of the input (inherited from the Circuit)
m integer
the size of the output (inherited from the Circuit)
truth table matrix (i.e. list of lists)
the description of the S-box (inherited from the Circuit)
dc dictionary
its keys are the criteria, its output are a boolean (True
if the criterion is complied with, False otherwise)
Objects of the class Sbox will be used in DES architecture in two different
modes:
• the standard one, in which all the inputs (i.e. the key and the plaintext)
are known;
3.1 S-box as Subclass of Circuit 27
• the one useful for cryptanalysis, in which one of the input can be un-
known.
In the first case it’s necessary to get the output for a certain known input:
this feature is realized through the method input2output of the Circuit
class.
def input2output (self , i ) :
”””
This method re turns the output f o r a requ i r ed input
: param i : a l i s t r e p r e s en t i n g a b inary input o f the
c i r c u i t
: re turn : the l i s t corresponding to the b inary
output f o r the input g iven as parameter
”””
return self . truth_table [ int ( '' . join (i ) , 2) ] [ self . n
: ]
In the second case the input value of the S-box could be unknown, so the
function truth table2formula() implemented by the Circuit class is used.
def truth_table2formula (self , f_vars ) :
”””
This method computes formulas r ep r e s en t i n g each
output b i t on the b a s i s o f the input ones .
: param f v a r s : exprvars v a r i a b l e s , one f o r each
input b i t
: re turn : a l i s t o f formulas d e s c r i b i n g the t r u t h
va lue o f each output b i t
”””
formula = [ expr (0 ) ] ∗ self . m
unconsidered_bit = [ True ] ∗ 4
for row in self . truth_table :
for out_pos in range ( self . m ) :
if row [ self . n + out_pos ] == '1' :
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# compute the expre s s i on corresponding
to the row
for in_pos in range ( self . n ) :
bit = f_vars [ in_pos ] if row [ in_pos ]
== '1' else Not ( f_vars [ in_pos ] )
if in_pos == 0 :
ex = bit
else :
ex = And (ex , bit )
if unconsidered_bit [ out_pos ] :
formula [ out_pos ] = ex
unconsidered_bit [ out_pos ] = False
else :
formula [ out_pos ] = Or ( formula [
out_pos ] , ex )
return formula
In brief, each output bit is the Or of all the inputs, that make it equal to
1. Each input corresponds to the And of its bits encoded by formula: if the
value in the truth table is true, the formula is considered as it is, it’s negated
otherwise.
Sbox extends the Circuit superclass with methods for the construction
and the verification of S-boxes design criteria until (S-6). The results of the
verification routine are stored into the dictionary dc. At the creation of the
S-box the minimum design criterion (that has to be verified) can be specified.
This is implemented through the generation of an io dictionary, that will be
passed as input to the Circuit
Also DES standard S-boxes can be reused, by passing the lookup table
lt of the specification as parameter, that will be converted into an io dic-
tionary through the method sbox std dict(), so its related Circuit can
be generated.
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@staticmethod
def _sbox_std_dict (s ) :
”””
This f unc t i on d e r i v e s the output f o r each p o s s i b l e
input o f an S−box from i t s lookup t a b l e
: param s : a matrix r ep r e s en t i n g the lookup t a b l e o f
a standard S−box
: re turn : the d i c t i ona r y in which the keys are the
input and the va l u e s are the corresponding output
f o r the g iven S−box
”””
d = {}
for i in range ( int ( '1' ∗ 6 , 2) + 1) :
bin_in = format (i , '06b' )
sr = int ( bin_in [ 0 ] + bin_in [ 5 ] , 2)
sc = int ( '' . join ( bin_in [ 1 : 5 ] ) , 2)
d [ bin_in ] = format (s [ sr ] [ sc ] , '04b' )
return d
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3.2 Analysis of S-1 and its Implementation
Remember, from Section 2.4, that criterion (S-1) asks that
Each S-box has six bits of input and four bits of output.
Of course, this is a minimal requirement that can be easily verified and set.
Verification
(S-1) can be easily checked thanks to a boolean expression on the size of
input and output.
self . dc [ '1' ] = ( self . n == 6 and self . m == 4)
Generation
The construction of (S-1) is easy, because it’s sufficient to specify the input
size equal to 6 and the output one equal to 4, that are set by the class Sbox
by default, such that it results:
S : {0, 1}6 → {0, 1}4
The other criteria are checked only if the first one is satisfied.
3.3 Analysis of S-2 and its Implementation
Remember from Section 2.4, that criterion (S-2) asks that
No output bit of an S-box should be too close to a linear function
of the input bits. (That is, if we select any output bit position and
any subset of the six input bit positions, the fraction of inputs for
which this output bit equals the XOR of these input bits should
not be close to 0 or 1, but should rather be near to 1/2)
It’s hard to define a construction method for (S-2) because of the hypothesis
of non linearity, that implies a random behaviour of the S-box.
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Verification
A verification method has been implemented, that computes the powerset of
the six possible input positions, in order to get each possible subset of input
indexes position. The method check dc2() checks if an output bit in a
certain position equals to the Xor of a given subset of input bits. This check
is done for each possible row of the truth table, output position and subset
of input indexes. If the number of rows for which the output bit equals the
Xor of the subset of input ones is lower than the 20% of the number of rows
of the truth table, or it is greater than the 80%, the second criterion isn’t
respected.
Generation
DESBoxGen does not implement a construction of S-boxes that respect (S-2)
that can be summarized as a random assignment of an output to a certain
input. In order to get S-boxes that comply with (S-2), it will be necessary
to generate completely random S-boxes, and then to verify whether (S-2) is
respected, getting rid of those which do not.
The reason behind the absence of the implementation of (S-2) takes into
account the generation of S-boxes that should respect criteria with a more
complex implementation method, as the fifth one.
3.4 Analysis of S-3 and its Implementation
Remember, from Section 2.4, that criterion (S-3) asks that
If we fix the leftmost and the rightmost input bits of the S-box and
vary the four middle bits, each possible 4-bit output is attained
exactly once as the middle four input bits range over their 16
range possibilities.
Starting from criterion (S-3) the idea of permutation is introduced into S-
boxes, therefore some additional operations must be done in the generation
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algorithm.
Verification
The verification method easily follows the specification: it generates the lists
of the output nibbles1 that have the same outer input bits and if a value is
present more than once in the same list, the verification fails.
Generation
During the implementation phase it has been noticed that the random gen-
eration of an S-box that respects (S-1) and (S-2) almost never lead to the
compliance with the third criterion. To solve this problem a randomized
generation algorithm has been implemented into the Sbox class to grant the
respect of (S-3). Going ahead with the criteria an increase of the difficult in
the generation of S-boxes that respect only a sample of Coppersmith’s design
criteria shows up. Due to this issue, the implementation of ad-hoc generating
functions is necessary in order to get a dictionary (io) satisfying a certain
criterion.
The rest of this section is denoted to grant the respect of criterion (S-3).
The S-box must behave like a permutation for fixed a and b
Pa,b(x) = S(a||x||b)
so 4 different permutations correspond to an S-box: P0,0, P0,1, P1,0, P1,1.
To respect this constraint, it is sufficient to assign a possible nibble (chosen
randomly from the list of the possible output nibbles for fixed outer input
bits), to a certain input so that
∀a, b ∈ {0, 1}.∀x, y.Pa,b(x) 6= Pa,b(y)
Once an output is selected from the list, it will be deleted to ensure the
uniqueness of the output.
1a nibble is a 4-bit digit, namely an element of {0, 1}4
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3.5 Graph-Based Stochastic Generation
An S-box that respects the third criterion almost never satisfies also the
fourth or the fifth one, then some additional work with graphs is made
through NetworkX [16], a Python language software package for the cre-
ation, manipulation, and study of the structure, dynamics, and function of
complex networks. The use of graphs in this context has been inspired by
the study [17], in which S-boxes that respected all the Coppersmith’s criteria
are generated, instead the aim of DESBoxGen is to satisfy only a subset of
Coppersmith’s criteria in order to analyze how SAT-Solvers react to these
changes.
Anyway, graphs will be used in order to find permutations Pa,b that re-
spect the criterion for fixed a and b. The respect of the criterion for a defined
permutation is a necessary but not sufficient condition, because input of dif-
ferent permutations have to satisfy the criteria as well. So graphs will be
used to find many different permutations, and other subroutines will look for
permutations that will respect (S-4).
3.6 Analysis of S-4 and its Implementation
Remember, from Section 2.4, that criterion (S-4) asks that
If two inputs to an S-box differ in exactly one bit, the outputs
must differ in at least two bits. (That is, if |∆Ii,j| = 1, then
|∆Oi,j| ≥ 2, where |x| is the number of 1-bits in the quantity x.)
The verification method is simply implemented following the specifications,
instead, for the generation one, some additional work with graphs is required,
as declared in Section 3.5.
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Verification
The routine for the verification of (S-4), check dc4(), computes for each
input, the ones that differ in exactly one bit and for each possible couple with
hamming distance equal to one compares their outputs: if their hamming
distance is lower than 2, (S-4) is not verified.
Generation
Rationale
To create an S-box that respects both (S-4) and (S-3) and hardly ever (S-
5), it’s necessary to define previously the permutations P0,0, P0,1, P1,1, P1,0
corresponding to an S-box. Let G1 be the graph of the possible input of a
permutation Pa,b, in which the vertices are the possible nibbles of input and
they are connected if and only if their hamming distance exactly 1.
(u, v) ∈ E ⇐⇒ |∆Vu,v| = 1
If two input nibbles are connected by an edge in G1, their output should
differ in at least two bits. The rationale behind the search for the output
values of a permutation Pa,b is to
• find a series of possible outputs for each “row” of G1 (as illustrated in
Figure 3.1), i.e. for fixed outer bits of the permutations, through the
construction of an intermediate graph G2.
• look for the output of the permutation Pa,b, such that outputs for inputs
that differ in exactly one bit, will differ in at least two bits, through a
graph G3.
Outputs for Fixed Outer Bits
The first step in the definition of a permutation
P : {0, 1}4 → {0, 1}4
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Figure 3.1: Graph G1 for the 4th criterion
is to fix its outer bits of input, in order to focus on outputs for inputs that
differ only in the two middle bits. Let Ca,b be the output of a permutation
for fixed a and b
Ca,b : {0, 1}2 → {0, 1}4
Ca,b(x) = P (a||x||b)
such that
∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}2, |∆(x, y)| = 1, |∆(Ca,b(x), Ca,b(y))| ≥ 2
Possible values for C can be found thanks to the generation of an intermediate
graph, G2, whose vertices are all the possible nibbles from G1, but in this
case are connected by an edge if and only if their hamming distance is at least
2. Notice that cycle in G2 corresponds to a possible output for a permutation
with fixed outer bits Ca,b.
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Output for a Permutation
In order to define a possible output for a permutation it’s necessary to find
4 cycles in G2, for all the possible outer bits of the permutations: C0,0, C0,1,
C1,1, C1,0. To ensure the compliance with the (S-4), if the outer bits of G2
C0,0 C0,1
C1,1 C1,0
Figure 3.2: Cycle C
differ in exactly one bit, Ca,b Ca′,b′ have to respect the following condition for
each index i ∈ [0..4]
∀xi ∈ Ca,b,∀yi ∈ Ca′,b′ |∆(xi, yi)| ≥ 2 (3.1)
such that if two inputs differ in one bit, their outputs must differ in at least
two bits. The search for some C that respect the condition and can be
considered as valid permutations, can be seen like the problem of finding
cycles in a graph G3, defined as follow.
Let G3 be the graph in which nodes are the cycles of G2 and they are
connected if and only if the constraint 3.1 is respected. Since cycles are
represented as tuples (x1, x2, x3, x4) and for simplicity two cycles are said
to be compatible and adjacent if and only if vertices in the same position
have an hamming distance greater or equal than 2, all the cycles should be
considered in each possible order in the construction of G3 to avoid to be
biased and to not consider some permutations in the complete generation.
The cycles in G2 are 2840, so considering their order there are 11360
cycles that should become the vertices of G3 (eight different representation
for each cycle). Because of the large number of cycles of G2 that should
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become vertices of G3, only a subgraph is considered: for each cycle C in
G2 only one of its representations is selected by a random choice and will
become a vertix of G3. Two vertices in G3 are connected if and only if the
hamming distance for nibbles in the same position inside a node is at least
2.
A permutation that allows the compliance with criterion (S-4) corres-
ponds to a cycle P in G3, such that
∀i ∈ [0..15], ∃C ∈ P. i ∈ C
The search for permutations is stopped when a certain number is reached
(by default this value is set to 3000) and it is repeated whenever an Sbox has
to be generated so that all possible permutations can be considered.
Random Generation of an S-box
For the random generation of an S-box it is necessary to find 4 different
permutations, P0,0, P0,1, P1,1 and P1,0, so that the design criterion can be
satisfied. Once a new S-box has to be generated, permutations are regen-
erated to avoid to be biased and not to exclude some permutations in the
generation of an S-box. In this phase permutations (represented as tuple of
tuples) can undergo an inner and an outer permutation described below:
• The inner permutation() in this case modifies the order inside the
tuples, so that they continue to be cycles, i.e. the hamming distance
for adjacent values in the tuple is at least 2.
• The outer permutation() modifies the order of tuples, so that the
tuples that form the permutation continue to represent a cycle of G3,
i.e. the hamming distance for values in the same position in adjacent
tuples is at least 2.
First of all, a permutation represented by a tuple of tuples is randomly chosen
among those ones previously generated and its elements undergo an inner
permutation and an outer one. These permutation will correspond to P0,0
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in the S-box, and its inner tuples will correspond respectively to C0,0, C0,1,
C1,1 and C1,0. In a similar way P0,1, P1,1 and P1,0 are found, but they re-
quire additional work. If we consider a permutation as it is, two different
permutations can result incompatible even if they could be. For this reason
it’s necessary to consider all the different inner orders and the outer ones to
check the compatibility between two permutations, i.e. if they can comply
with criterion (S-4) if they are chosen as permutations for inputs that differ
in just one of the outer bits. These steps are done through the application
of the subroutine get comp() that finds permutations compatible with the
others given as input. Once P0,0 is chosen, the build function looks for
• P0,1 that has to match P0,0
• P1,0 that has to match P0,0
• P1,1 that has to match P0,1 and P1,0
All these steps lead to the creation of a dictionary that will correspond to an
S-box in compliance with the 4th of Coppersmith’s design criteria.
3.7 Analysis of S-5 and its Implementation
Remember, from Section 2.4, that criterion (S-5) asks that
If two inputs to an S-box differ in the two middle bits exactly,
the outputs must differ in at least two bits. (If ∆Ii,j = 001100,
then |∆Oi,j| ≥ 2.)
As for (S-4), the verification method easily follows the specifications, instead
the generation one is quite complex and requires some work with graphs, as
discussed in 3.5,
Verification
The routine for the verification of (S-5), check dc5(), complements the
two middle bits for each possible inputs so that for inputs that differ in the
3.7 Analysis of S-5 and its Implementation 39
two middle bits exactly it can check if the hamming distance between their
outputs is at least 2. If it exists a couple of inputs that differ in their middle
bits and the hamming distance between their outputs is lower than 2, the
criterion isn’t verified.
Generation
Rationale
To create an S-box that respects both (S-5), (S-4) and (S-3), like for checking
the 4th criterion, it’s necessary to define previously the permutations P0,0,
P0,1, P1,1, P1,0 corresponding to an S-box. Let G1 be the graph of the possible
input of a permutation Pa,b in which the vertices are the possible nibbles of
input and they are connected by an edge if and only if their hamming distance
exactly 1 or if they differ in their two middle bits exactly.
(u, v) ∈ E ⇐⇒ |∆Vu,v| = 1 ∨∆Vu,v = 001100
As a result of the additional constraint for Coppersmith’s 5th design criterion,
in this case each row isn’t a cycle but a 4-clique
If two input nibbles are connected by an edge in G1, their output should
should differ in at least two bits. The rationale behind the search for the
output values of a permutation Pa,b is to
• find a series of possible output for each ”row” of G1 (as illustrated in
figure 3.3), i.e. for fixed outer bits of the permutations, through the
construction of an intermediate graph G2 almost as for the 4th criterion
• look for the output of the permutation Pa,b, so that outputs for inputs
that differ in exactly one bit or in their middle bits, will differ in at
least two bits, through a graph G3
Outputs for fixed outer bits
The first step in finding the output of a permutation
P : {0, 1}4 → {0, 1}4
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Figure 3.3: Graph G1 for the 5th criterion
is to fix its outer bits of input, in order to focus on outputs for inputs that
differ only in the two middle bits. Let Ca,b be the output of a permutation
for fixed a and b
Ca,b : {0, 1}2 → {0, 1}4
Ca,b(x) = P (a||x||b)
such that
∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}2, x 6= y, |∆(Ca,b(x), Ca,b(y))| ≥ 2
Similarly to the (S-4) case, possible values for C can be found thanks to the
generation of an intermediate graph, G2, which vertices are all the possible
nibbles like in G1 and they are connected by an edge if and only if the
hamming distance is at least 2. In contrast to the 4th criterion in this case a
possible output for a permutation with fixed outer bits Ca,b isn’t represented
by a cycle but by a clique because each row of G1 corresponds to a 4-clique
since both (S-4) and (S-5) have to be complied with.
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Output for a permutation
In order to define a possible output for a permutation it’s necessary to find
4-cliques in G2, for all the possible outer bits of the permutations: C0,0, C0,1,
C1,1, C1,0. To ensure the compliance with the 5th criterion, if the outer bits
C0,0 C0,1
C1,1 C1,0
Figure 3.4: Cycle C
of vertices in G2 differ in exactly one bit or in their two middle bits, Ca,b
Ca′,b′ have to respect the following condition for each index i ∈ [0..4]
∀xi ∈ Ca,b,∀yi ∈ Ca′,b′ |∆(xi, yi)| ≥ 2 (3.2)
such that if two inputs differ in one bit or in their middle bits, their outputs
must differ in at least two bits. The search for some C that respect Condition
3.2 and can be considered as valid permutations, can be seen as the problem
of finding cycles in a graph G3, defined as follow.
Let G3 be the graph in which nodes are the 4-cliques of G2 and they
are connected if and only if Condition 3.2 is respected. Since cliques are
represented as tuples (x1, x2, x3, x4) and for simplicity two cliques are said
to be compatible and adjacent if and only if vertices in the same position
have an hamming distance greater or equal to 2, all the 4-cliques should be
considered in each possible order in the construction of G3 to avoid to be
biased and to not consider some permutations in the complete generation.
In constrast to the 4th criterion, the number of 4-cliques is 228, so this
allows a complete representation of G3, which vertices are 5472, because for
each 4-clique we consider all its possible permutations. Two vertices in G3
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are connected if and only if the hamming distance for nibbles in the same
position inside a node is at least 2.
A permutation that allows the compliance with (S-5) corresponds to a
cycle P in G3, so that
∀i ∈ [0..15],∃C ∈ P.i ∈ C
The search for permutations is stopped when a certain number is reached
(by default this value is set to 3000).
Random generation of an S-box
For the random generation of an S-box it is necessary to find 4 different
permutations, P0,0, P0,1, P1,1 and P1,0, so that the design criterion can be
satisfied. Once a new S-box has to be generated, permutations are regen-
erated to avoid to be biased and not to exclude some permutations in the
generation of an S-box. In this phase, permutations (represented as tuple of
tuples) can undergo an inner and an outer permutation described below:
• The inner permutation() in this case modifies the order inside the
tuples, by considering each possible permutation of the values because
all the vertices in the clique are connected by definition, so each per-
mutation is still a clique, i.e. the hamming distance for adjacent values
in the tuple is at least 2.
• The outer permutation() modifies the order of tuples, so that the
tuples that form the permutation continue to represent a cycle of G3,
i.e. the hamming distance for values in the same position in adjacent
tuples is at least 2 exactly like for (S-4).
First of all, a permutation represented by a tuple of tuples is randomly chosen
among those ones previously generated and its elements undergo an inner
permutation and an outer one. These permutations will correspond to P0,0
in the S-box, and its inner tuples will correspond respectively to C0,0, C0,1,
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C1,1 and C1,0. In a similar way P0,1, P1,1 and P1,0 are found, but they re-
quire additional work as for (S-4). All the possible order for a permutation
have to be considered in order to check compatibility through get comp()
like in the previous case with the subroutine inner permutation() and
outer permutation() just described. Once P0,0 is chosen, the build function
looks for
• P0,1 that has to match P0,0
• P1,0 that has to match P0,0
• P1,1 that has to match P0,1 and P1,0
All these steps lead to the creation of a dictionary that will correspond to an
S-box in compliance with (S-5).
3.8 Analysis of S-6 and its Implementation
Remember, from Section 2.4, that criterion (S-6) asks that
If two inputs to an S-box differ in their first two bits and are
identical in their last two bits, the two outputs must not be the
same. (If ∆Ii,j = 11xy00, where x and y are arbitrary bits, then
∆|Oi,j| 6= 0)
For criterion (S-6) only a verification method has been implemented and is
explained below.
Verification
The routine for the verification of the 6th criterion, check dc6(), computes
for each input the list of inputs that differ in their first two bits and have
the same last two ones, through the complementary of the first ones and
each possible variations of the middle ones. For each couple it checks if their
outputs are different, i.e. if their hamming distance isn’t zero. If a couple
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of inputs that doesn’t respect this constraint exists, then the criterion isn’t
verified.
Chapter 4
DESBoxGen’s Architecture
DESBoxGen is a tool meant for logical cryptanalysis on DES and its variants.
The variant of DES instance allows the specification of:
• a number of round, by default 16 as in DES standard algorithm
• the S-boxes that can replace DES standard ones and can be specified
in three different ways:
– through an identifier (an integer or a string) that identifies a series
of S-boxes previously stored
– through a list of objects that are instances of the class Sbox()
– through the method sbox generator(min dc), that takes as in-
put a minimum design criterion (min dc) that must be satisfied
through the following condition.
all (s . dc [ str (i ) ] is True for i in s . dc . keys ( ) if
int (i ) <= min_dc )
If min dc isn’t specified, the standard S-boxes are used.
class Des :
def __init__ (self , rounds=16, sboxes=None , min_dc=None )
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Even if DESBoxGen is meant for logical cryptanalysis it allows the standard
encryption expected from DES, so two main mode can be found in DESBox-
Gen:
• The standard one, in which all the bits of the plaintext and the key are
known.
• The one meant for cryptanalysis that allows the presence of unknown
bits both in plaintext and in the key used for the encryption.
def crypt (self , encrypt=True , key=None , plaintext=None ,
key_dict=None , plaintext_dict=None , pair='0' )
In the case of logical cryptanalysis with chosen plaintext attack, an identifier
pair can be specified in order to distinguish the variables related to different
couples (plaintext, ciphertext).
4.1 Inputs to List
First of all the casting of the inputs, i.e. the key and the plaintext, has to
be executed. If the input is completely known, the string could be in binary
or not:
• If the string isn’t a binary value, it will be converted into a list of bits
(each char corresponds to 8 bits)
• If the string represents a binary value, a casting into list will be applied
to the string
If the input isn’t completely known (for example, key=None, equally for
plaintext) a list of 64 variables is created: each variable corresponds to
a certain bit of the unknown input. If only a part of the input is known (for
example in the case of key key is None and key dict() isn’t empty) the
value of these bits is set to 0 or 1 as specified into the dictionary of known
bits received as input. All the following steps of the encryption algorithm
will work on these list of length 64.
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Figure 4.1: DES complete schema
48 4. DESBoxGen’s Architecture
4.2 Keys Generation
The generation of the round keys is the same if the key is known or unknown.
First of all PC1 is applied (for the explanation of permutations see 4.3), then
the key is split into two halves, the left and the right part. For each of the two
halves a shift is applied, the number of shifts is defined by DES specification.
Once the shift is applied, the two halves are merged again and PC2 will be
applied on the resulting key.
4.3 Permutations and Similar Operations
A series of operations in DES involve only a permutation of values: bits have
to change their previous position with another one according to a lookup
table. In code it results:
def permutation ( formula , table ) :
return [ formula [ permuted_pos−1] for permuted_pos in
table ]
This edit is suitable for the following operations:
Initial Permutation IP the first permutation applied on the plaintext
Expansion-box E the expansion applied on the right half of the
message
Permutation-box P the permutation applied on the right part
after the application of the S-box
Final Permutation FP the permutation applied on the concatena-
tion of the two halves of the message after
all the rounds of the Feistel network, that
give as output the complete ciphertext
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4.4 Xor and S-box: operations with different
behaviour depending on the mode
Unlike the operations discussed before in 4.3, the Xor and the Substitution
performed by the S-box may vary depending on the execution mode, i.e. if
there are unknown input bits that should be detected through logical crypt-
analysis. The difference from 4.3 depends on the kind of operation that has
to be executed: while in the previous case the permutations rely on the bits
indexes and not on their value, in this case there is a major stress on the bit
itself compared to its position.
4.4.1 Standard Encryption Mode
If the algorithm is executed in the easiest encryption mode, both Xor and
S-box perform their standard execution.
[ str ( int (i ) ˆ int (j ) ) for i , j in zip (f1 , f2 ) ]
Listing 4.1: Xor in standard encryption
The Xor is performed element by element in the two lists f1 and f2. This
operation is applied in two moments:
• the Xor between the round key and the right part of the message after
the application of the Expansion-Box
• the Xor between the right part of the message after the application of
the Permutation-Box and the left half of the message
After the first one the S-box as to be applied. The 48-bit input of the S-box,
represented by a list with length equal to 48, is divided in 8 lists of length 6
and the substitution is applied on each sublist.
The S-box that has to be applied corresponds to an instance of the class
Sbox previously described in chapter 3, so it could be different from DES
standard one. For each sublist the output is recovered through the method
input2output of the class Sbox described in 3.1.
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[ s_out for i in range (8 ) for s_out in self . sboxes [ i ] .
input2output ( s_in [ i ] ) ]
Listing 4.2: S-Box in standard encryption
4.4.2 Logical Cryptanalysis Mode
The second case, i.e. the presence of unknown bits in an input, is treated
differently from the other one just described. In both case in the end the
output will be composed by a binder and a binding obtained through the
replace() routine (as explained in section 1.3.2).
• The binder will be the new variable that will correspond to a certain
bit of the result.
• The binding will link the previous value of the bit(represented by a
complex formula) to the new variable (i.e. the binder)
In the case of Xor, the values of the bit before the execution of the replace()
are summarized by the following code:
tmp_xor = [ And (Or (i , j ) , Or ( Not (i ) , Not (j ) ) ) for i , j in
zip (f1 , f2 ) ]
Listing 4.3: Xor in encryption for logical cryptanalysis
instead in case of S-box, they will be:
s_tmp = [ s_out for i in range (8 ) for s_out in self . sboxes [ i
] . truth_table2formula ( s_in [ i ] ) ]
Listing 4.4: S-box in encryption for logical cryptanalysis
In the end the list of complex formulas will contain just the new vari-
ables in order to simplify further operations. The functions (xor() and
substitution()) will return two values:
• the list of binders that will reflect the edit on Ri
• the list of bindings that will be restored in the end
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4.5 Encryption to Logical Cryptanalysis
The return values of the encryption (decryption) algorithm are:
bin out the list of bits representing the ciphertext, if all the input
bits were known, the list of the corresponding formulas
otherwise
str out the string corresponding to the result of the algorithm
(None if some bits in the resulting ciphertext are un-
known)
binding the list of all the bindings that have to be restored if there
were unknown bits in the inputs
These return values are meant for logical cryptanalysis on DESBoxGen. The
attack for which DESBoxGen is implemented for is logical cryptanalysis with
chosen plaintext attacks.
First of all one or more couple of (plaintext, ciphertext) have to be re-
covered. DESBoxGen easily implements the generation of these couples
through the standard execution of the algorithm with completely known
inputs (i.e. key and plaintext). Secondly, in order to emulate a known plain-
text attack, DESBoxGen encrypts the plaintext with an unknown key, so
the results of the encryption algorithm are a list representing the complete
ciphertext and a list of bindings introduced during the computation. The
value of the ciphertext isn’t considered so far. The operation just described
is iterated for each pair (plaintext, ciphertext), and the values of the formu-
las, the ciphertexts and the bindings are stored into three different lists.
Once all the pairs have been parsed, des dimacs cnf() is executed, in
order to generate the DIMACS CNF file that will be given as input to the SAT-
Solver. Each pair corresponds to a formula that has to be recovered through
the list of the 64 bits encoded in a certain formula, the final value of these
bits (given by the known ciphertext) and the bindings introduced during the
computation that link the plaintext to the bits representing the ciphertext.
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The process that will restore the link between the list of formulas (rep-
resenting the bits) and ciphertext is quite simple:
• the value of each bit is encoded in a formula but this value is known
because it represents a bit in the ciphertext
– if the value of that bit in the ciphertext that represents is 1, the
formula representing the bit is considered as it is (f)
– otherwise if the value is 0, the formula representing the bit is
negated (Not(f))
• all the formulas representing a bit are merged by And
In order to restore all the binders it’s sufficient to apply the And between the
formula just recovered and the bindings. By iterating this process for each
formula and by doing the And between all the ones representing a certain
pair, the final formula will be obtained.
At this point it’s sufficient to apply expr2dimacscnf() (implemented by
PyEDA) on the complete formula in order to get the DIMACS CNF corres-
ponding to all the pairs encrypted with the same key.
Chapter 5
Evaluation of Coppersmith’s
Criteria
Thanks to DESBoxGen there are all the elements for the evaluation of Cop-
persmith’s criteria by way of SAT Solving. In this phase three different SAT
Solvers have been used:
Picosat A SAT-Solver written in C [18] that has several
bindings in other languages, such as Pycosat in Py-
thon and PiGoSAT in Go.
CryptoMiniSat5 A SAT-Solver mostly written in C++ [19, 20] with
interfaces for command-line, C++ library and Py-
thon.
Lingeling A SAT-Solver written in C [21, 22] that has taken
part to several SAT Competitions.
Theoretically a bigger number of rounds, pairs or minimum design criterion
respected by S-boxes should imply an increase in both the accuracy of the
results and the time required by a SAT-Solver in recovering the key used
during the encryption phase.
Twenty sets of S-boxes have been built for each criterion to compare
the behaviour of SAT-Solvers applied on different version of DES. Therefore
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in total there are 120 sets, i.e. 960 S-boxes different from the standard
ones. Random keys and messages were used in order to produce several pairs
(plaintext , cipertext) for the generation of DIMACS CNF through DESBoxGen.
Below several tests are discussed with variations in number of rounds and
pairs for each of Coppersmith’s criteria until (S-6).
5.1 Results with 2 Rounds
Tests on the first round are not repeated here, because only half of the
ciphertext is affected by the key therefore it should be too easy for a SAT-
Solver to find a solution. The results of tests displayed below refer only to a
number of pairs bigger than 4 due to their statistical relevance.
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2 Rounds with 4 Pairs
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Lingeling seems to comply with Coppersmith’s rationale about criteria even
if it requires additional time compared to the others SAT-Solvers. The most
unexpected behaviour of Lingeling is the rapid increase followed immediately
by a little decrease in (S-4). After that point the behaviour of Lingeling seems
to be in accordance with Coppersmith’s revelation.
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In Picosat instead there’s a good compliance of Coppersmith’s criteria: the
line of plot is in continue growth. The behaviour of CryptoMiniSat with
a close look appears in contrast with Coppersmith: there is a continuous
decrease until (S-4). Only after (S-4) there is the expected increase up to
(S-6).
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2 Rounds with 8 Pairs
In this case the results show a discrepancy from the previous ones and from
Coppersmith’s declaration only in the last steps. The point of disagreement
is (S-5): in the passage from (S-4) to (S-5) there is a deep decrease of the
complexity of the problem that the SAT-Solvers have to deal with.
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This phenomenon is more evident in Lingeling, but also in CryptoMiniSat
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and Picosat that have a very similar shape. Lingeling continues to take more
time than the others two in finding solutions and breaking DES variants.
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Also the time required by solving formulas involving (S-6) shows disagree-
ment with Coppersmith: the time in (S-6) is lower than many others, for
example notice in the plot that Lingeling takes less time to find a solution
for formulas involving (S-6) than (S-3) on average.
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2 Rounds with 16 Pairs
In these results there is a certain discrepancy. There are meaningful vari-
ations in the application of Lingeling that shows downfalls getting bigger
from (S-4) to (S-6), opposed to expectations. Also the time required in solv-
ing formulas involving (S-3) seems to require less time than the ones involving
(S-2).
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With a close look to Picosat an unexpected decrease at (S-5) can be noticed
but unlike Lingeling the time required at (S-6) is compliant with Copper-
smith.
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Instead in CryptoMiniSat there isn’t a similar phenomenon at (S-5) but it
can be found at (S-3). It could seem that the respect for only the property
of non linearity, (S-2), is sufficient to increase the difficulty in breaking the
algorithm in this case. In the remaining part of the plot of CryptoMiniSat
it seems that there is a compliance with Coppersmith’s rationale.
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2 Rounds with 32 Pairs
Lingeling has an irregular behaviour by varying the criteria respected by
the S-boxes. It seems that the difference in the criteria complied with isn’t
relevant for Lingeling in this case. The curve as several oscillations and
downfalls that are in complete disagreement with Coppersmith.
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Instead, in Picosat there is a major compliance with Coppersmith until (S-5)
but there is a significant downfall till (S-6).
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Also the behaviour of CryptoMiniSat doesn’t show a total compliance with
Coppersmith: it’s sufficient to see the downfall in (S-5) and (S-6).
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2 Rounds with 64 Pairs
The behaviour of Lingeling seems to respect Coppersmith’s criteria more,
as displayed by the increase of time required by CNF built in the respect
of (S-4) compared to (S-3). Anyway there are decreases in the first three
criteria and also in (S-5). The major compliance with the criteria may be
due to the number of pairs given as input that should increase the difficulty
of the problem.
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With a close look to Picosat and CryptoMiniSat several oscillations can be
observed: for these two SAT-Solvers the difficulty introduced by the criteria
doesn’t seem relevant.
5.2 Results with 3 Rounds
The addition of another round increases the avalanche effect and the com-
plexity of the problems that the SAT-Solvers have to deal with. Also in this
case tests are done with different numbers of pairs (plaintext, ciphertext) to
observe more deeply some variations between the SAT-Solvers by changing
the criteria complied with. As in the previous case only the results of tests
that refer to a number of pairs lower than 4 aren’t displayed.
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3 Rounds with 4 Pairs
By the application of Lingeling is seems that Coppersmith’s rationale isn’t
complied with. The most evident conflict with the criteria defined by Cop-
persmith can be found on DIMACS built through (S-5) and (S-6) that require
less time than (S-4) ones.
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A significant unexpected downfall can be also seen in the plot of Picosat and
CryptoMiniSat in correspondence of (S-4) that requires less time than (S-3)
and (S-6) that requires less time than (S-5).
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3 Rounds with 8 Pairs
The results of Lingeling as in the previous case are more unstable by changing
the minimum design criteria complied with. The time required by the first
criteria exceed the one required by the others.
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Picosat and CryptoMiniSat instead seem to have a bigger stability and a
certain growth according to Coppersmith’s rationale with the exception of
Picosat in (S-3). Also the stationary points in the plot of CryptoMiniSat are
unexpected and the slight decrease in correspondence of (S-5).
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3 Rounds with 16 Pairs
The stability of both CryptoMiniSat and Lingeling of the previous case seems
lost. Also in this case it appears that these results don’t take into account
Coppersmith’s idea.
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3 Rounds with 32 Pairs
In this case there are several unexpected behaviours. The most significant
ones are the spike of Lingeling on (S-2) and the one of CryptoMiniSat and
Picosat on (S-5).
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5.3 Results with 4 Rounds
The addition of the fourth round, as in the passage from 2 to 3 ones, increases
the avalanche effect, the complexity of the problems and by consequences the
time required for solving them.
4 Rounds with 1 Pair
Now the overhead required by Lingeling (that previously made its perform-
ances worts than the others) seems to improve it in a significant way: it is
the SAT-Solver that required less compared to the others.
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In this case the worst performances are that ones of Picosat, that in certain
cases required more than an hour and a quarter to find a solution for a
formula (a problem in (S-4)) differently from CryptoMiniSat and Lingeling
that took about one minute.
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Despite the differences in time, the shape of the curve is quite similar for all
the SAT-Solvers. The results until (S-4) seem to comply with Coppersmith’s
rationale. This accordance disappear in (S-5) that show a deep decrease in
the required time in contrast with the results attained.
Conclusions and Outlooks
Through this thesis and DESBoxGen it has been demonstrated the possibility
of creating S-boxes that respect only a sample of Coppersmith’s criteria. As
showed by the experimental results it has been noticed that the compliance
with the criteria doesn’t affect in a deep way the performance in time of the
three SAT-Solvers chosen for these tests.
Often it seems that the time required in solving logical problems involving
(S-5) is lower compared to the one involving some of the previous criteria.
The S-boxes in compliance with this criterion are an interesting object of
further study, as well as the ones respecting at least (S-4) that required a
non indifferent solving time on average.
In order to get results with a greater statistical relevance and to express
a better judgment about the relation between Coppersmith’s design criteria
and the difficulties in breaking DES algorithm and finding the key, other tests
should be done with more resources, that lacked during the development of
this thesis, to take the full advantage of logical cryptanalysis.
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